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Revisiting History-What Have We
Learned About Private Antitrust
Enforcement That We Would Recommend
To Others?
By Donald I. Baker*

I. Introduction: Mission Statement
When Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, the framers
looked back 267 years to the Statute of Monopolies, which had been
enacted by the English Parliament in 1623 as a model for private
antitrust actions in the United States. That venerable landmark, which
had long since been forgotten in England, made monopolies illegal
and allowed anyone who was injured by a monopoly to recover treble
damages and double costs.' This idea then turned
up in Section 7 of
2
the Sherman Act, but with only single costs.
Suppose that the British government came back to us today
and asked: "What have you learned in the 114 years of actually
applying this idea that you pinched from us? We never had much
experience with it ourselves. Please tell us whether you would
recommend that we enact a new Statute of Monopolies of 2004,
embodying your language, policies, and experiences in providing
private remedies for our consumers and enterprises?"
* Senior Partner, Baker & Miller, PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Former Assistant

Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
1 Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. I, c. 3 (1623) (Eng.). The statute provided a
civil remedy for victims of prohibited monopolies: "wherein all and every such
person and persons which shall be so hindered, grieved disturbed or disquieted...
shall recover three times so much as the damages which he or they sustained...
and double costs." Id. The statute arose out of the celebrated Case of Monopolies
(Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602), in which the
plaintiff sought to block the defendant from infringing the playing card monopoly
that had been granted by Queen Elizabeth.
2 Act of July 2, 1890, § 7, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210, superseded by the Clayton
Act, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (now codified as 15 U.S.C. § 15), and ultimately
repealed by 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
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Putting it this way may sound cute, but the question is serious.
The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act probably qualify for National
Legal Landmark status, and they have been broadly successful in
encouraging active private antitrust enforcement. With private
enforcement of competition law having suddenly arrived as a policy
goal in the U.K., the European Union ("EU"), and elsewhere, the
question is far from hypothetical. We should look hard at what we
have learned and ask ourselves how much of it we would recommend
to other friendly governments and parliaments. Or, more
provocatively, how much of it would we even recommend to
ourselves if we were forced to start over from scratch under some sort
of "zero based legal budgeting" concept.

II. Some Fundamental Questions
In responding to Her Majesty's Government, the European
Commission ("EC"), or some other friendly government, we should
start with the premise that the purpose of modern competition law is
to protect the competitive process from cartels, unreasonable
restraints, and improperly acquired or maintained monopolies; to
regulate anticompetitive mergers; to promote business efficiency; and
to protect consumers. Our recommended private enforcement system
would therefore be evaluated in terms of how successfully it helps to
implement these goals without unreasonably deterring legitimate
business activities or unnecessarily burdening the judicial system. In
other words, how efficient is it likely to be in helping to deter and
prohibit illegal conduct, while providing a fair and efficient way of
compensating victims?
With that background, let me roll out a laundry list of basic
questions:
1. Should there be mandatory trebling of damages for all
antitrust violations?

3 The European Commission has recently announced that it will undertake "a
study of the conditions governing claims for damages in case of infringement of EC
competition rules." See European Commission, EC Open procedure
COMP/2003/Al/22, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/
proposals2/study-tender-specifications.pdf (last visited May 4, 2004) (hereinafter
"EC PrivateRemedies Notice"). In explaining it, the Commission stated that, "It is
well established that private enforcement of the EC competition rules is lagging
behind public enforcement. This negatively impacts on compliance incentives and
ultimately the efficiency of the EC competition rules." Id.
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2. Should there be a one-way cost rule in favor of a
prevailing plaintiff? Or, a "loser pays" rule? Or, no cost
shifting at all (which is the normal American cost rule)?
3. Should there be joint and several liability with no right of
contribution?
4. Should private plaintiffs be able to use government
decisions and judgments as prima facie evidence of
liability?
5. Is "antitrust injury" the right test for standing?
6. Should indirect purchasers be excluded?
7. Should there be a "passing on" defense?
8. Should purchasers in overseas transactions be excluded
from domestic remedies?
9. How should the inevitable conflict between private
litigation and government amnesty programs be
minimized?
10. Should an antitrust enforcement agency ever be able to
grant an exemption against private litigation (as under
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty)?
11. Alternative forums for private antitrust claims: can
arbitration of antitrust claims be made fair and effective?
Needless to say, I do not expect everybody-or maybe anybody-to
This just proves that these questions are
agree with all my answers!
4
worth talking about.

4 My questions were formulated before I had seen the EC Private Remedies
Notice. But, it turns out that issues raised in my questions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 11 are
raised in that notice. See generally id.
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III. Discussion
1. Should There be Mandatory Trebling of Damages for All
Antitrust Violations?
Awarding treble damages in antitrust cases was intended by
Congress in 1890 to encourage private enforcement of a new law for
which no appropriation for public enforcement had been provided.
Fear of non-enforcement or minimal enforcement by the Attorney
General was certainly an appropriate political concern back then. It
also echoes the English Parliament's apparent purpose in 1623, when
it declared illegal monopolies that had been granted by Kings and
Queens over the centuries and tried to encourage private challenges
to the banned monopolies. 5 In both statutes, treble damages offered a
form of bounty hunting.
But, today, much has changed and hence the policy rationale
for treble damages must necessarily change. Today, the United States
has adequately funded and staffed federal antitrust enforcement
agencies and most of the largest private antitrust damage cases are
follow-on cases in the wake of the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
prosecutions of major cartels. A similar pattern can be seen in
countries such as Canada, with major private cases usually following
on from prosecutions by reasonably funded government agencies.
The core, modern rationale for treble damages must be
deterrence. 6 The cost of wrongdoing must be large and clear in
advances; treble damages clearly provide this where the type of
wrongdoing is beyond any serious dispute (as in most criminal cartel
cases). Yet, this rationale is somewhat diluted by the enormous
increase in public enforcement against cartels. There is a lot of
activity and cooperation among public agencies. Very large fines
have been authorized by legislatures and collected by enforcers. For
example, a Swiss company, Hoffman-LaRoche, has paid over $1
billion in fines to the United States and the EC after being

5

Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. I, c. 3 (1623) (Eng.). Obviously, in those

circumstances, the prospects of public enforcement against monopolies were
virtually nil. The King's favorites, and the heirs of the past Kings, were the likely
targets of enforcement under the statute.
6 See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La-Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 35557 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 966 (Dec. 15, 2003).
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apprehended as the ringleader in the Vitamins cartel. 7 On top of this,
significant jail sentences for individual cartel participants have
become a practical reality; hence, a critical part of the "cartel
deterrence package" in the United States and may help explain why
so many of the largest cartels have been led by foreign companies
and individuals.8
Because no one thinks that price-fixing and market-allocation
are socially desirable activities, awarding treble damages on top of
large fines in such cases does not allow a lot of debate or dissent.
Both remedies are penal and both must necessarily add something to
the cartel deterrence package and encourage enterprises to develop
and police effective compliance programs. Based on my own
experience, I would ask whether the individuals who actually engage
in cartel activities tend to worry about the company having to pay
large fines or damages, as opposed to worrying about getting caught,
fired, and sent to jail themselves.
Once you get beyond the areas that involve Sherman Act
criminal violations, 9 the policy case for having a cross-the-board
penal damage remedy becomes a lot less clear. Civil cases for joint
venture, distribution, or licensing violations look a lot more like
ordinary tort cases. They may involve serious injuries for which the
injured plaintiff(s) should be compensated. But, that is not the policy
question at issue here. The question here is: why every successful
antitrust plaintiff should receive a bounty for bringing the case, or
why every losing antitrust defendant should be hit with a penalty?
There are alternatives. Actual damages could be the normal
rule for antitrust violations that do not fall into the criminal category,
which would tend to bring us somewhat more into line with the rest
of the world and probably reduce the level of conflict discussed

Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish
Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693, 701 (2001); EC
http://europa.eu.int/euravailable
at
Release,
Commission
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_006/1_006200301 10en000100089.pdf (last visited May 4,
2004).
8 Baker, supra note 7, at 701-702. I also believe that the chance to avoid the
7

likely imposition of jail sentences increases the comparative attractiveness of the
DOJ's amnesty program vis-A-vis other's enforcement programs where this risk is
not present or probable; and, it helps explain why the U.S. agency has apparently
been the recipient of the amnesty applications in most of the recent international
cartel cases. Id. at 707-710, 713.
9 Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: ProsecutorialDiscretion in
Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1978).
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below in connection with Question 8.10 Or, in addition, the trebling of
damages could be made discretionary under clarified standards. Or,
as an alternative, punitive damages could be allowed for antitrust
torts in cases where recidivism is found and deterrence was a key
consideration.
The reality is that many antitrust cases turn on ambiguous
facts, legitimately contested legal principles, and theoretical
economics. The line between winning and losing may be exceedingly
fine in such cases, and yet, no matter how close the case, the winner
gets a bounty and the loser gets a penalty. This seems to be wrong as
a matter of policy. Over-deterrence and unpredictability are recurring
problems in various antitrust areas subject to the rule of reason, and
the risks of litigating close questions are simply magnified by the
presence of mandatory treble damages to punish any "wrong" action.
Congress has recognized this reality in a number of discrete instances
involving R&D joint ventures and export companies that satisfied
certain regulatory standards. In each instance, Congress has provided
for single damages."
The practical effect of mandatory trebling is to tilt the
settlement process in the plaintiff's favor because mandatory trebling
so inflates the defendant's cost of losing and the plaintiff's value of a
victory in a rule of reason case.1 2 Is this favoritism something that we
really would want to recommend to other nations for all kinds of
competition law violations? If so, how would we explain it?
Mandatory trebling can distort judicial decision making on
substantive and procedural questions because it necessarily makes
judges more reluctant to impose liability in close cases and more
willing to erect narrower standing rules. In Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,13 the Supreme Court articulated a concern about the risk of
10 Interestingly, in Canada, a private plaintiff can only recover for conduct that
is criminal in nature. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 36 (1985) (Can.).
11 Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982); National
Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a) (1992). In these
instances, Congress also provided a "loser pays" cost rule, to make the litigation
less attractive to private plaintiffs. See also Donald I. Baker, Restating Law and
Refining Remedies: The Trading Company Act, The Joint Research Act, and The
Local GovernmentAntitrust Act, 55 ANTrrRUST L.J. 499 (1986).
12 Mandatory trebling has a similar effect on the amount of settlements and
deterrence of litigation in cases following on a criminal conviction or guilty plea
for price-fixing or market-allocation. However, in such cases the deterrence
rationale for mandatory trebling is much clearer.
"3 453 U.S. 720 (1977).
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double recovery, but the reality that any double recovery would be six
fold recovery was, I am sure, a key reason why the majority was
willing to adopt a much narrower standing rule than applies in
modem tort law, a bad choice that I shall return to in discussing
Question 6.14
The other side of the coin is that the availability of treble
damages necessarily encourages the filing of marginal and/or
innovative antitrust cases. In other words, treble damages encourage
any imaginative lawyer to try to repackage a business tort into an
"antitrust" box whenever it is plausible to do so. The famous case in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Co. 15 was not about
whether the plaintiff was to be compensated, but whether its common
law damages were going to be trebled on a dubious "intra-enterprise
conspiracy" theory which had cropped up over the years under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Mandatory trebling, despite its English origins, seems to have
become a uniquely American concept. Most American state
legislatures have followed Congress and adopted mandatory treble
damages for violations of state
antitrust laws, but no foreign
6
parliament has taken this route.'
Reflecting on our history, I could not recommend mandatory
trebling on all antitrust violations to a foreign parliament. The idea
still has serious merit when applied to the more serious types of
violations generated by cartels-whether local, national, or
international. In these instances, a penal remedy is appropriate.
Allowing treble damages for only a limited set of cases would

14

See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

15

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Co., 467 U.S. 752,771-74 (1984).
Those thinking about private remedies in foreign countries have generally

16

been critical of mandatory trebling in the United States. See, e.g., WOUTER P.J.
WILS, THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS, 19 (Kluwer ed., 2002).
The trebling of damages could be looked at favourably as
compensating for less than unitary probability of apprehension, but it is
too crude a method to serve that function. It appears to overstate the
likelihood of apprehension for concealable offenses such as price
fixing, and to understate it for other easily detectable offences,
including most exclusionary practices.
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necessarily require the foreign parliament to draw
a line that we have
17
never attempted to draw in the United States.
2. Should There be a One-Way Cost Rule in Favor of a
Prevailing Plaintiff? Or, a Loser Pays Rule? Or, No Cost
Shifting?
The Clayton Act rule on costs is unusual in that only the
plaintiff may ever recover "the cost of suit" upon prevailing. The
successful defendant gets nothing. This departs from the normal U.S.
rule that each side must pay its own litigation costs, regardless of the
result. The normal rule in the rest of the world generally requires that
the loser must pay the winner's reasonable litigation costs. The
traditional English cost rule may explain why the Statute of
Monopolies allowed the successful plaintiff to recover double costs
as well as treble damages; 18 the plaintiff was given an extra incentive
to offset his risk of having to pay the defendant's costs if he lost.
The one-way cost rule in the Clayton Act simply echoes and
enhances the effect of mandatory trebling, as already discussed. It
further tilts the risk evaluation and settlement process in favor of the
plaintiff. Thus, in at least two instances, involving qualified export
companies and joint research ventures, Congress has provided a
"loser pays" rule to reduce the threat of litigation against such
favored activities. 19 Since the antitrust damage plaintiff is already
getting the potential bounty of treble damages, the place where -the
one-way cost rule seems most important is in equity cases under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act. The fact that such a plaintiff can
recover costs is definitely an incentive to seek an injunction.
There are alternatives, as I have already noted. Most of the
rest of the world uses a "loser pays" rule. 20 This generally tends to
reduce plaintiffs' incentive to litigate and would be a particularly
17

But see discussion above concerning Section 36 of the Canadian

Competition Act, allowing private damage recovery only for criminal type
violations of the Act.
18 Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. I, c. 3 (1623) (Eng.). See also Case of
Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
19 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a) (1992). See also Baker, supra
note 11.
20 As already noted, Congress attempted to reduce the risk of weak or
frivolous litigation against export trading companies by providing a "loser pays"
cost rule in lieu of the Clayton Act rule or the normal American cost rule. See 15
U.S.C. § 4001 (1982).
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significant deterrent to class action plaintiffs' counsel. 2 ' Another
alternative is what is normally referred to as "the American rule" of
letting each side bear its litigation costs, regardless of outcome.
In advising a foreign parliament, I would advise "use your
own normal cost rule, unless you particularly want to encourage
competition law cases generally or of a particular type." If the goal
were special encouragement, I would recommend that the parliament
should adopt the Clayton Act rule of one-way 22costs, with the case for
doing so being strongest in injunctive actions.
It would also be possible to differentiate between different
types of antitrust cases, just as I have recommended with regard to
mandatory trebling of damages. In other words, a legislature could
single out price-fixing, market-allocation, and other hard-core
violations for one-way cost treatment, while leaving other types
subject to the country's normal rule, which in most countries would
be a "loser pays" rule.
3. Should There be Joint and Several Liability with No Right of
Contribution?
Although Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not explicitly
provide for joint and several liability among antitrust defendants,
this has been accepted as the rule in antitrust conspiracy cases. When
the related issue of whether there was a right of contribution among
antitrust co-defendants reached the Supreme Court in 1981,24the Court
said "no" in Texas Industries Inc. v. RadcliffMaterialsInc.
The practical result of this holding is to give antitrust
plaintiffs additional leverage, on top of treble damages, in the
settlement bargaining process. Not surprisingly, and quite
appropriately, any plaintiff will try to pay each defendant off against
every other defendant, by accepting low offers to initial settlers,
while making escalating demands against those who remain. The
final defendant is likely to face a very large settlement demand,
It does not appear that exceptions to the normal "loser pays" rules have been
adopted in the Canadian provinces or the U.K., when some forms of class actions
have been authorized.
22 In a "loser pay" system, the Clayton Act result could be replicated by
providing that the losing antitrust plaintiff need not compensate the successful
defendant for its attorneys fees and litigation costs, in an injunctive action or
generally.
23 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 15.
21

24

Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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because at trial, it could be made liable for the total damage caused
by the conspiracy less settlements received by the plaintiff(s).2"
Whether such a result is desirable as a matter of policy is an
open question. In thinking about it, it is useful to review how the
Supreme Court looked at the issues in Texas Industries. The Court
recognized that contribution could more justly allocate damages
among the antitrust defendants, but it saw great practical problems in
coming up with a workable allocation formula in any particular
case. 2Damages might be "allocated according to market shares,
relative profits, sales to the particular plaintiff, [each defendant's]
role in the organization and operation of the conspiracy or simply pro
rata ... on the theory that each one is equally liable for the injury
caused by the collective action." 27 Obviously, such uncertainty would
invite considerable litigation. The Court therefore suggested that any
solution need be legislative. 28 This seems correct.
Contribution based on some simple and comprehensible
formula offers a fairer system of allocating damage liability than we
presently have. Accordingly, although Congress has declined to touch
the issue, I would recommend to a foreign parliament that it provide
for contribution based on a single variable, such as sales of the
product during the conspiracy, when enacting private antitrust
legislation. While a multi-factor formula might be fairer in various
cases, it could be harder to administer in virtually all cases.
4. Should Private Plaintiffs be Able to Use Government
Decisions and Judgments as PrimaFacie Evidence of
Liability?
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, simply
provides that "A final judgment or decree ... that a defendant has
violated said [antitrust] laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under said laws as to all matters
respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as

Id. at 639. Of course, co-defendants in a conspiracy case can resolve the
issue and avoid this risk with a damage sharing agreement based upon whichever
formula they agree.
26 Id. at 637.
25

27 Id.
28

Id. at 647.
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between the parties thereto.
,,29
This rule does not apply to nolo contendere pleas in criminal
cases or consent decrees in civil cases, and thus, it generates real
incentives for the target of a government investigation to settle, rather
than litigate. Even where the DOJ has a sufficiently strong hand to
insist on a guilty plea as a condition for settlement of a criminal case,
Section 5(a) concerns will cause the target to bargain hard for a
narrower charge and a shorter time period of violation because of the
consequences in follow-on civil cases.
The basic Section 5(a) rule makes good sense in terms of
efficiency. There are no strong policy reasons to force private victims
to re-prove what the government has already established. The case
for such a rule may be even stronger in a foreign country where
private plaintiffs normally do not have available the full range of
discovery devices available to U.S. plaintiffs.
The only basis for criticizing this type of "prima facie
evidence" rule is that it increases a defendant's risk of actually
litigating a close civil case against the government. If the government
wins, then the defendant(s) face follow-on suits in which the
plaintiff(s) do not have to prove liability. The point is well illustrated
in the recent DOJ action against Visa and MasterCard in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
network rules barring members from issuing American Express and
Discover Cards violated the Sherman Act, even though Visa had won
a recent Tenth Circuit decision against Discover going the other
way. 30 Now, Visa and MasterCard face the likelihood of large treble
cases from American Express and Discover--cases which they might
have avoided if they had entered into consent decrees, rather than
litigating against the DOJ.
That said, the "prima facie evidence" rule in Section 5(a)
seems a sensible way to save judicial resources and burdens in
private litigation, while maximizing the benefits of governmentfunded enforcement. Accordingly, it is something that we should
recommend
to the foreign parliament considering private antitrust
litigation. 331
29 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2004).
30 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003); SCFC, Inc.

v. Visa U.S.A., Inc, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (June
19, 1995).
31 Section 20 of the U.K. Enterprise Act of 2002 amends the Competition Act
of 1998 to provide that, in private actions, the court is bound by a determination of
liability made by the Office of Fair Trading or the Competition Appeal Tribunal.
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5. Is "Antitrust Injury" the Right Test for Plaintiff Standing?
To have standing, a plaintiff must be able to show "antitrust
injury"-in other words, "injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent." 32 This is an important doctrine that is much
needed in the United States because the lure of treble damages and
one-way costs cause a plaintiff to try to turn every possible
competition-related dispute into a private antitrust case.
The basic "antitrust injury" rule articulated by the Supreme
Court is that the private plaintiff can only recover under the Clayton
Act for economic injury that flows from a lessening of competition.
This reflects the fundamental U.S. policy that, "[ilt is competition,
not competitors, that the Act protects., 33 Proving an antitrust
violation is not enough unless the plaintiff's injury flows from a
lessening of competition created by the violation.
The point is clearly illustrated by the seminal and unanimous34
Supreme Court decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat.
The plaintiffs, a group of bowling alley operators charged that
Brunswick, the leading maker of bowling equipment, had made a
series of bowling center acquisitions that were illegal under Section 7
of the Clayton Act because the "failing company" doctrine had not
been properly applied, and that the plaintiffs' centers would have
been more profitable if some of the Brunswick-acquired centers had
gone out of business or been acquired by "less anticompetitive"
purchasers. 35 The Court flatly rejected this theory, noting that it was
essentially the survival of the centers, in whose ever hands, that was
the basis for the plaintiffs claim. 36 Therefore, to award damages to
these plaintiffs would be "inimical to the purposes of these [antitrust]
laws" because the plaintiffs' theory was "designed to provide them
with the profits they would have realized had competition been

See
Enterprise
Act,
2002,
ch.
40
(Eng.).
See
also
http://www.hmso.gov.uk?acts/acts2002/200040--c.htm#20 (last visited May 4,
2004).
32 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977);
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1986); Ad.
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990).
33 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
34 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
35 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
36

Id. at 487-88.

2004]

PrivateAntitrust Enforcement Recommendations

391

37
reduced" by the demise of the Brunswick-owned centers.
The rule applies equally in an injunctive action, where lesser
profits in the future, rather than past losses, may be the focus. Thus,
in a post-Brunswick merger decision, the Supreme Court made clear
that a firm would only establish "antitrust injury," and hence standing
to challenge a merger of its competitors, if it could show that likely
predation flowing from the merger threatened the plaintiff with
destruction. 8 A merger might be illegal because it threatened to bring
about a substantial lessening of competition, but this would not
generate "antitrust injury" to the competitor-plaintiff in the normal
case.
This "antitrust injury" filter is sound, and therefore, is
something from the U.S. experience that a foreign parliament should
consider including in private antitrust remedies legislation. It is too
easy to confuse "injury to competitors" with "injury to competition,"
and an explicit "antitrust injury" standard would help minimize the
risk.

6. Should Indirect Purchasers be Excluded?
My firm answer is "no." Indirect purchasers should have
standing to sue, but under procedural rules that encourage or even
mandate consolidation of their claims with those of direct
purchasers.3 9
As we all know, in its famous, or infamous, decision in
Illinois Brick v. Illinois in 1977,40 the Supreme Court held that only
direct purchasers from cartel members have standing to bring federal
antitrust suits for recovery of their losses under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act. 4' The Court was moved to interpret Section 4 in this
way because of concerns about reducing the incentives of direct
purchasers to sue, increased complexity of tracing causation in
indirect purchaser litigation, and especially the increased risk of
double recovery, which would become six fold recovery under the
mandatory trebling feature of Section 4.42
37

Id. at 488.

38 See Cargill,479 U.S. at 104.
39 See Donald I. Baker, Hitting the Potholes in the Illinois Brick Road,
ANTITRUST MAG.,

Fall 2002, at 14.

40 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
41Illinois Brick, 453 U.S. at 736.
42 See generally id.
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The decision was plainly, and not surprisingly, unpopular
because it denied some clear antitrust victims access to the federal
courthouse to recover for their losses against a class of wrongdoers
who attracted little sympathy. It stirred up the political populists who
have provided continuing support for federal antitrust legislation
from the time of the Sherman Act onward. This political reaction was
present in Washington, but became more prominent and effective in
state capitals in some major states like California, Arizona, and
Minnesota. This led to the so-called "Illinois Brick Repealer"
statutes, under which indirect purchasers were given the right to sue
for treble damages under state law. The message was quite simple:
"If the Supreme Court bars the door to indirect purchasers under the
Clayton Act, we'll just provide a better remedy under state law."
These statutes, which now number about 20, were plainly
inconsistent with the "no double recoveries" policy that the Supreme
Court had made the cornerstone of its Illinois Brick analysis.
Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided that these "Illinois Brick Repealer" statutes ought to be
struck down under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution as
repugnant to federal law.43 This was not, however, the end of the
story. The DOJ, in the spirit of Reagan Administration federalism,
urged the Supreme Court to hear the case and reverse the Ninth
Circuit.4 4 This the Supreme
45 Court did in California v. ARC America
Corp. in early 1989. What the Supreme Court said, this time
unanimously, was that there was no evidence that Congress had
intended to displace state law in the antitrust area.4 6 In these
circumstances, the Court (in an opinion by Justice White, the author
of Illinois Brick) found that there could not be federal preemption
under the Supremacy Clause.4 7

The ultimate Supremacy Clause problem is that the "no
double recoveries" policy set forth in Illinois Brick was not a creature
of Congress. It was made up by the Supreme Court as a policy
interpretation of Section 4, without any evidence that Congress had
intended to prevent indirect purchasers from recovering under the
Clayton Act, let alone evidence that Congress had intended to prevent
43

In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).

44

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, State of California v. ARC

Am. Corp. (Nov. 1988) (No. 87-1862), availableat 1988 WL 1026146.
45 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
46

ARC America, 490 U.S. at 102.

47

id.
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states from allowing indirect purchasers to sue. The "no double
recoveries" policy only makes sense if the states are preempted from
establishing "double recoveries" regimes. The Supreme Court was
unwilling to do this in ARC America, and thus, it opened the door to a
burgeoning cascade of state court cases under sometimes quite
bizarre statutes.
It is federalism at work. It is not something that we would
recommend to our friends in Ottawa, Canbarra, or any other federal
capital. For them, it is easy enough to say: "Don't follow Illinois
Brick. Rather, allow antitrust plaintiffs to sue as you would allow
other tort plaintiffs to do, based on proof of reasonably foreseeable
injury." This is not just a federalism message. I would recommend
that a unitary state not deny standing to indirect purchasers to seek
recovery of whatever losses they can prove.
For us in the United States, we have a much more
complicated mess to unwind in the wake of Illinois Brick and ARC
America. We face a world of complexity and uncertainty in which
opportunism abounds, judicial efficiency is minimized, and some
victims go uncompensated while other plaintiffs, and their attorneys,
collect windfalls. Meanwhile, defendants can be subjected to not only
multiple recoveries for the same wrong, but also all the costs and
uncertainty of litigating the same wrong in different courthouses
under different state laws and procedures.
The situation requires a political response in the form of a
legislative act that can command reasonably broad support among
those interested in antitrust rights and remedies. In the United States,
we need a federal "Antitrust Victims Rationalization Act" with the
following main features, which I would generally be willing to
recommend to a foreign parliament as a way of bringing order and
fairness to the "indirect purchaser" issue:
* Illinois Brick would be overruled and indirect purchasers
would be authorized to sue in federal courts under Section
4 of the Clayton Act, subject to realistic proof
requirements. Such a result would be much more consistent
with modem tort theory.
* Special case consolidation and managements rules could
be enacted to assure that direct purchasers and those
purchasing from them could perhaps have their competing
claims adjudicated in the same court.
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* Specific rules for allocating recoveries between direct
purchasers and indirect purchasers probably should be
enacted, to streamline what could become a very
complicated process. A two-stage, interpleader-like
procedure could be created: first, there would be a total
damage trial leading to a verdict on the defendants' total
liability to the plaintiff group; and, this would be followed
by a second damage-allocationtrial among the direct and
indirect purchasing plaintiffs. The same fact-finder
probably should decide both, and a settlement could be
possible at either stage or both.
e In the United States, federal preemption of state remedies
in this area would be highly desirable. Or, at the least,
defendants should have the right to remove state law cases
to federal court and have them consolidated with pending
federal claims.48
This package of provisions would substantially reduce the
mind-numbing complexity and duplication of claims that we have
today in the United States. To that extent, it is rational. Maybe it is
rational enough to make progress on Capitol Hill, even in the face of
loud arguments from those who profit from today's complexity. No
one, including consumers and enterprises, is well served by a system
that maximizes litigation costs and legal uncertainties. As far as I
know, no foreign country or court has adopted the Illinois Brick rule.
So, they are able to start with a cleaner slate than we have. But, I
would still recommend that any foreign parliament consider enacting
some case consolidation and damage allocation rules along the lines
that I have suggested.
7. Should There be a "Passing On" Defense?
It was almost surely Justice White's search for symmetry that
produced the Illinois Brick result, as Justice Blackmun lamented in

48 It would be necessary to preempt state laws that were not based on normal
damage principles, such as the "return of full consideration" statutes (e.g., Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-115 (2004)) and the "per consumer penalty" statutes (e.g.,
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A (2004)). See Ciardi v. F. HoffmannLaRoche Ltd., 436 Mass. 53, 762 N.E.2d 303 (2002). These statutes no doubt seek
to respond, but in arbitrary ways, to the difficulty noted in Illinois Brick, of actually
proving damages in indirect purchaser cases.

2004]

PrivateAntitrust Enforcement Recommendations

395

his dissent.49 In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
the Supreme Court had recently held, in an opinion also written by
Justice White, that there was no "passing on" defense-i.e., the
defendant could not defeat the plaintiff's claim by showing that the
plaintiff had passed on the full amount of the overcharge to its
customers and hence had suffered no "injury to its business or
property" under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 50 The Court noted that
allowing such a defense would complicate damage cases substantially
and 5increase
the plaintiffs' burden while reducing their incentives to
1
sue.

Hanover Shoe always seemed to be a sensible result. Section
4 is concerned both about compensating victims and deterring
violations, as reflected in trebling damages, and allowing such a
defense would clearly weaken the deterrence aspect of the statute.
The issue is wonderfully illustrated by the Electrical Equipment
Cases in the 1960s.52 The defendant manufacturers had clearly
overcharged the utilities for turbine generators, transformers, and
switchgear, but the utilities had included these overpriced purchases
in their regulated rate bases, thus ultimately passing the costs on to
consumers. As between the price-fixing manufacturers and the
perhaps complacent utilities, the latter were still the more deserving.
If the utilities' claims were defeated on "passing on" grounds, the
manufacturers would get a windfall of extra conspiracy-generated
revenues. If the utility plaintiffs were allowed to recover, they might
be forced by regulators to use at least some of the recovery to reduce
their rate bases and hence benefit consumers.
Finally, the risk of an "initial purchaser windfall" from a "no
passing on rule" would be largely eliminated by adoption of the
49 The Illinois Brick plaintiffs, Justice Blackmun wrote in his dissent, "are the

victims of an unhappy chronology. If Hanover Shoe... had not preceded this case,
and were it not 'on the books' I am positive that this court would be affirming,
perhaps unanimously, the judgment of the Court of Appeals." 431 U.S. at 767. He
added that the Court's effort to "be 'consistent' in its application of pass on ... [is]
for me a wooden approach, and is entirely inadequate when considered in the light
of the objectives of the Sherman Act." Id. at 766.
50 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
51

Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493-94.

52

Between 1961 and 1964, 1,919 separate antitrust cases were filed in 36

districts against General Electric, Westinghouse, and other manufacturers of
electrical equipment in the wake of a series of high profile Justice Department
price-fixing and bid-rigging indictments. See generally Neal & Goldberg, The
Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel JudicialAdministration, 50 A.B.A.J.

621 (1964).
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consolidated approach to direct and indirect purchaser claims that I
recommended in responding to Question 6. The total overcharge
would be initially determined in the trial against the price-fixing
sellers, and then the "passing on" issues would be decided in the
context of a damage allocation proceeding involving the initial
purchasers and various subsequent purchasers in the chain.
8. Should Purchasers in Overseas Transactions be Excluded
from Domestic Remedies?
The answer here, I think should be "yes" because it does not
make good sense or good international law for a country to impose its
domestic law on foreign torts that arise out of foreign transactions.
This is an important and politically sensitive subject, but, so far as the
United States is concerned, the Supreme Court will answer the
question this term in F. Hoffinan-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. 53
The question is broader than a confusing 1982 statute.54 It
concerns what the international lawyers refer to as prescriptive
jurisdiction-jurisdiction to establish laws over individuals,
transactions, and disputes. 5 Thus I would ask: would we Americans
recommend that any foreign sovereign that suffers adverse
competitive effects in its territory should offer a damage remedy
under its law for all those injured anywhere in the world without
regard to the situs of a plaintiffs injury? And, perhaps it could then
add a bounty to encourage foreign victims to bring their cases in the
courts of the legislating sovereign?
International law and comity would suggest that the answer to
these questions is a clear "no." A foreign parliament should be able to
set the rules for recovery by its local consumers from domestic sellers
for competition law violations, just as it enacts the property, contract,
and tort rules governing these same transactions. Establishing the
legal rules governing transactions and disputes among its nationals
No. 03-724, cert, granted, 124 S, Ct. 966 (2003).
54 See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).

53

We have just written an amicus curiae brief for three foreign governments
concerned about extraterritorial exercises and extraterritorial jurisdiction in another
pending Supreme Court case potentially involving some related issues. The brief
55

questions whether and to what extent the United States can exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction (i.e., legislate substantive law) with respect to torts committed abroad
by foreigners in violation of "the law of nations." See Brief of the Governments of
the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain, and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners, Sosa v. Alvarez Machain (Jan. 23, 2004) (No. 03-339).
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and residents is an important aspect of sovereignty.
The issue today is focused on the United States because no
other nation has adopted the bounty system of treble damages or
other special rules strongly favoring private antitrust plaintiffs. The
parliaments of other leading countries, including the United Kingdom
and some other E.U. Member States, have all recently enacted
statutes allowing private actions for competition law violations, but
have chosen to do so on a more limited basis (normally allowing only
single damages and having a "loser pays" cost rule). These are
legislative judgments made by democratic governments after
considering the issues.
The much more generous U.S. private claim system clearly
makes Clayton Act remedies in U.S. courts the remedy of choice
without regard to where the plaintiffs injuries actually occurred, so
long as there is in personam jurisdiction over a defendant. The
celebrated English jurist, Lord Denning, who was my hero when I
studied law in England in the 1950s, incitefully observed: "As a moth
is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he
56
can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune."
But, the thought is not confined to foreign judges and scholars. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said very much
the same thing more recently in relation to antitrust jurisdiction:
[A]ny entities, anywhere, that were injured by any conduct
that also had sufficient effect on United States commerce
could flock to United States federal court for redress, even
if those plaintiffs had no commercial relationship with any
United States market and their injuries 57were unrelated to
the injuries suffered in the United States.
Enlarging the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States to
provide a U.S. antitrust remedy to foreign buyers with no cognizable
U.S. nexus will clearly raise conflicts with foreign courts and
enforcers. 58 This includes interference with the sovereignty to

56

Smith Kline & French Labs Ltd. v. Bloch, 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A. 1982).

57 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac V.O.F., 241 F.3d 420, 427-

28 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Statoil ASA v. HeereMac V.O.F., 534
U.S. 1127 (2002).
58 See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc. Corp. v. Westinghouse, W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977)
(discovery denied); British Airways v. Laker Airways, W.L.R. 544, 588-91 (C.A.
1983) (injunction against U.S. suit); U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
ch. 11 (Eng.) (administrative action authorized to block foreign litigation).
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provide remedies that may be more limited than U.S. remedies 59 and
a weakening of their amnesty programs, which I shall discuss shortly.
This no doubt explains why five E.U. Member States have
filed
60
Empagran.
in
jurisdiction
U.S.
opposing
briefs
amicus curiae
The argument for expansive U.S. jurisdiction essentially rests
on treble damages and the other plaintiff-favoring U.S. rules. It
simply boils down to arguing that, because U.S. rules are more penal,
deterrence will be increased by allowing suits in U.S. courts by
victims, wherever located, of a cartel that injures U.S.-based victims,
too. 6 1 This is not necessarily correct, because of the potential impact
on amnesty programs. There are two related issues that go into the
deterrence equation-the perceived likelihood of being caught and
likely effect if you are caught. Amnesty programs bear on the former,
while the penal remedies of jail and treble damages relate to the
latter. Even if there were no effect on amnesty, offering foreign
purchasers from foreign sellers the unique American remedy of treble
damages would be an exercise of judicial imperialism likely to
interfere with the legislative sovereignty of other nations.
Such expansive prescriptive jurisdiction is certainly not
something that I would recommend a foreign government adopt, but
the issue is probably fairly theoretical unless the foreign government
is prepared to adopt a penal damages system as well.
9. How Should the Inevitable Conflict Between Private Antitrust
Litigation and Governmental Amnesty Programs be
Minimized?
Price-fixing, market-allocation, and other cartel activities can
sometimes generate enormous profits. Those who are tempted to
participate have every incentive to keep their activities secret from
their supervisors and/or any broader community. They know that
their activities are illegal and they generally keep them secret
internally because they want to claim that any "better results" flow
from entrepreneurial skill rather than collusion. These realities have
59

See Kleus-Heinez Lehne, Hands Off Our Torts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2003,

at A20.
60

Germany and Belgium filed amicus briefs in addition to the previously

noted brief of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands. See Brief of the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae, F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (2004) (No. 03-724), available at 2004
WL 226388.
61 See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 35557 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 966 (2003).

PrivateAntitrust Enforcement Recommendations

2004]

399

made the detection of cartels such a difficult exercise for government
enforcers everywhere. And, their difficulties have been compounded
when the cartel operates on an international basis because critical
evidence and key participants are likely to be scattered around the
globe. 62 During the 1990's, the situation has changed with the
adoption of new amnesty and leniency programs, which vastly
increased the incentives for a cartel participant to come forward and
reveal a cartel to the governmental enforcers. 63 The modern programs
have been pioneered by the DOJ, 64 but the EC and other
65 leading
enforcers have adopted leniency/amnesty programs as well.
Typically, the leniency applicant and its employees can
receive total or substantial immunity from criminal liability and
government-imposed antitrust penalties if it is the first to come
forward with credible evidence of a cartel before the enforcement
authority has knowledge of the cartel or has begun an investigation.
The terms vary as each country assesses the proper mix of incentives
and penalties. The Chairman of the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, John
Vickers, has explained that the "carrot of leniency" creates "a
potential competition-a race to the competition authorities-for
those contemplating the illegally agreed suspension of price
competition. '6 The program offered by the DOJ is made stronger
and more effective because the Department, unlike most of its foreign
counterparts, can offer culpable employees amnesty from criminal

62

See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003).
63 See generally Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter
and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693, 707-09 (2001)
[hereinafter Criminal Law Remedies].
64 See Scott D. Hammond, Lessons Common to Detecting and Deterring
Cartel Activity (Sept. 12, 2000) (Remarks at the Third Nordic Competition Policy
Conference), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/6487.htm (last
visited May 4, 2004).
65 Commission Notice on Immunity From Fines and Reduction of Fines in
Cartel Cases, O.J. (C 45), at 3-5 (Feb. 19, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comnm/competition/anfitrustleniency (last visited May 4, 2004).
See also John Vickers, Chairman of the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, Competition

Economics (Dec. 4, 2003) (Royal Economic Society Annual Public Lecture),
available

at

http://www.oft.gov.uk/News/Speeches+and+articles/2003/speO5-

03.htm (last visited May 4, 2004); Cartel Immunity Program, Ireland Competition
Authority (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.tca.ie (last visited May 4, 2004).
66 See Vickers, supra note 65.
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prosecution that would be likely to send them to jail.67
There is widespread concurrence that leniency programs have
been "spectacularly successful," in the words of Irish Competition
Authority member, Terry Calvani,68 and have "proved a formidable
tool for encouraging firms to cooperate" according to European
Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti.6 9 Amnesty applications
have apparently triggered a majority of cartel prosecutions in the
United States. International convergence on amnesty programs has
been encouraged because it is "far more attractive for companies to
simultaneously seek and obtain leniency in the United States, Europe,
Canada, and
7 1 in other jurisdictions where the applicants have
exposure."
Amnesty and leniency programs are all based on creating
sufficient positive incentives for the amnesty/leniency applicant to
come forward and expose the cartel. Under the present systems, a
government, or several governments, may offer an amnesty applicant
a complete pass on exposure to government-imposed liabilities, but
there is no favorable treatment with respect to the private litigation
that is sure to ensue once the government(s) prosecutes the amnesty
applicant's competitors. Thus the potential amnesty applicant must
weigh (1) the advantages of amnesty (including no or lower corporate
fine and individual immunity) against (2) the prospects that the cartel,
if abandoned, will remain undetected and (3) the potential damage
exposure that it will surely face if it seeks amnesty.

67

See Baker, CriminalLaw Remedies, supra note 63, at 709.

68

Terry Calvani, Enforcement of Cartel Law in Ireland, 2003 Fordham

Corporate Law Institute (Barry Hawk ed., forthcoming 2004), available at
http://www.tca.ie/speeches/tc law-soc.pdf (last visited May 4, 2004).
69 See Mario Monti, The Fight Against Cartels, Speech presented at the
European
Marketing
Academy
(Sept.
11,
2002),
available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.getfile=gfsdoc=SPEECH/O
2/384/0/AGED/g=ENtype=pdf (last visited May 4, 2004).
70 See Raymond Krauze & John Mulcahy, Antitrust Violations, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 241, 270-71 (2003).
71 Deputy Assistant Attorney General James M. Griffin, The Modem Leniency
Program After Ten Years, A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division's
Criminal Enforcement Program (Aug.
12,
2003),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201477.htm (last visited May 4, 2004).
72 Foreign competition lawyers confirm this point: in determining whether to
seek leniency and provide evidence, companies specifically weigh the public fine
and private damages exposure against the probability of detection. See Laura
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Private damage exposure is definitely part of the amnesty
equation. The point was graphically underscored in 2003, when the
Japanese trading company, Mitsui, was held liable by a jury in the
District of Columbia for $147 million in treble damages as a result of
a cartel that its U.S. subsidiary had exposed to the government and
received amnesty.73
The various government enforcers are clearly concerned
about potential treble damage exposure weakening the incentives for
parties to seek amnesty and expose cartels. This concern is reflected
in at least two very recent developments:
* The DOJ has been supporting legislation now passed by
the Senate that would make the amnesty applicant only
liable for actual damage claims, rather than treble
damages.7 4

* The Governments of the United Kingdom, Netherlands,
Ireland, Belgium, and Germany have filed amicus curiae
briefs in Empagran, arguing that imposing U.S. treble
damages on foreign transactions would weaken their
amnesty/leniency programs.75 The Solicitor General
strongly supported their argument
in the Government's
76
amicus curiae brief in this case.
These actions reflect appropriate concerns by government enforcers.
It is bizarre to provide a penal system of damage recovery against a
party that has voluntarily done what the government is encouraging it
to do, namely to come forward and expose the cartel on which the
suit is based. This penal remedy clearly weakens the incentives for
Carstensen & Shaun Goodman, Cartel Regulation (United Kingdom), ch. 22, 10001 (Global Comp. Rev. eds., 2001).
73 Mistui, others hit with $147 million antitrust verdict, FORBES.COM (June 13,
2003),
available
at
http://forbesbest.com/homeasia/newswire/
2003/06/13/rtr9999888.html (last visited May 5, 2004).
74 See The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act, H.R.
1086, 108th Cong. (2003).
75 See Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (Feb. 3, 2004) (No. 03724), available at 2004 WL 226597.
76 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (Feb. 3, 2004) (No. 03-724), available
at 2004 WL 234125.
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the whistleblower to come forward. Likewise expanding the
whistleblower's penal exposure globally (as the Empagran plaintiffs
seek) will reduce its incentive to go to seek amnesty from any foreign
agency where the cartel may have some impact in the United States.
The disincentive may be strongest vis-A-vis a foreign agency that
for individuals, because its law
cannot offer the carrot of immunity
77
individuals.
punish
not
does
The global impact of U.S. treble damage litigation is
particularly clear in the amnesty area. The EC has abandoned its
traditional requirement that a leniency/amnesty applicant make a
detailed written submission because such submissions have been held
78
To encourage
to be discoverable in U.S. litigation.
leniency/amnesty applicants to continue to come forward, the
Commission now authorizes detailed oral submissions, which are
generally taped.79
My conclusion is that all enforcers' amnesty programs are
definitely weakened by the likelihood that the amnesty applicant
faces treble damage exposure in the United States. How much a
particular program is weakened is likely to depend on particular
circumstances, including the potential amnesty applicant's nexus to
the United States and its estimate of its likely damage exposure in the
United States. In sum, this is just another instance where mandatory
trebling has at least some perverse side effect. This could be largely
avoided. As long as there is joint and several liability, granting the
amnesty applicant single damage exposure would not leave the cartel
victims uncompensated. But, it would encourage plaintiffs to pursue
the other cartel participants that they could recover treble damages
against.
Thus, my recommendation to a foreign government would be
that the whistleblower be offered less civil exposure than other cartel
participants. In a joint and several liability system, the whistleblower
A former German Minister of the Economy has noted that "the Empagran
decision jeopardizes the success of the corporate leniency program in Europe since
the incentive to disclose information to the authorities voluntarily will be reduced if
companies must fear private class actions in the United States brought by plaintiffs
from all over the world." Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Antitrust Law as a Regulatory
Factor in a Globalized Market Economy, at 4, Lecture at the XI International Cartel
Conference of the Federal Cartel Office, Bonn, Germany (June 19, 2003).
78 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 2000-2001 Trade Cases (CCH) 72,914
77

(D.D.C. 2000), where the EC and the Canadian government had participated as
amici opposing U.S. discovery of an amnesty before their agencies.
79 The tapes are generally transcribed, but control of the transcriptions is
retained by the Commission staff.
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could never be offered civil amnesty based on an enforcement agency
determination that (i) the whistleblower was the principle source of
the government's case, and (ii) other co-conspirators were available
to compensate cartel victims.
10. Should an Antitrust Enforcement Agency Ever be Able to
Grant an Exemption Against Private Litigation as the
European Commission can do Under Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty?
This is an important subject that is almost never discussed, at
least in the United States. There are at least two circumstances where
a government might have an interest in providing immunity against
private damage litigation. The first, as just discussed, is the amnesty
situation where the potential defendant has come forward and
revealed serious wrongdoing by others. The second is where the law
is unclear and potentially worthwhile private activity is apparently
being deterred by legal uncertainty and the threat of private actions.
The first just raises again the number of amnesty policy question, but
the second raises a broader set of issues.
Legal uncertainty can become an important consideration in
various joint venture contexts, especially where substantial
commercial risks and/or very large capital demands are faced at the
initial stage of a project. The United States has a process of
advisory opinions that can be sought from the DOJ or the Federal
Trade Commission. These agencies issue various forms of
"guidelines" designed to provide guidance, but these guidelines give
no legal protection against private litigation.
By contrast, in Europe, the EC and the enforcement agencies
of Member States can grant exemptions under Article 81(3). They
can exempt conduct on broader public interest grounds or because it
is not likely to produce an adverse effect. These exemptions can be
granted on an individual application limited to a certain transaction
or contractual provision, or on a bloc exemption decision covering
types of conduct or arrangements. Many EU Member States have had
When this power is exercised in Europe under Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty, the Commission's action is primarily concerned with the validity of the
relevant provision. In other words, if the provision violates Article 81(1) and is not
immunized under Article 81(3), then it is void and unenforceable as between the
parties. Damage cases in Europe are more likely to arise out of cartel activities,
where there is no Article 81 issue.
81 See Donald 1. Baker, Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures: Rules
80

or Roulette?, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 999 (1993).
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similar exemption procedures under their own laws.
This is an idea that is worthy of consideration by any
parliament designing a system of private competition law remedies
because it does offer an avenue to increased certainty for those
engaged in entrepreneurial ideas. But there are also clear downsides
as well because this responsibility could divert agency attention and
resources from higher priorities and subject it to additional political
pressures.
Why there is no such authority in the United States probably
reflects the American tradition of "you can't trust the Government."
It may also reflect a reality that the U.S. antitrust agencies would not
want this kind of authority, and the political pressures that might go
with it, to grant exemptions in particular cases or areas. The result is
that, in the United States, the granting of any exemption, small or
large, is almost always a matter for Congress, whose efforts over the
years have produced a truly random collection of statutory
exemptions.
The one U.S. exception, where the DOJ was given the power
to exempt, has not been a particularly happy one. In 1970, Congress
enacted the Newspaper Preservation Act in order to preserve
alternative news and editorial voices in a given local area.8" As part
of this legislation, the Attorney General was authorized to immunize
and approve so-called "joint operating agreements" under which
competing local newspapers could agree on prices to be charged
advertisers and subscribers. 83 This unusual provision represents a
balance of the "pro-consumer direction of the antitrust laws and a
congressional desire ...that diverse editorial voices be preserved
despite the unique economics of the newspaper industry. 84 The
resulting process involved contentious investigations and hearings
that took a lot of Antitrust Division resources, but ultimately the
applications were approved by the Attorney General, regardless of
what the Antitrust Division or an administrative law judge had
recommended. Judicial review then ensued, producing some quite
complex cases. 85 Needless to say, the newspaper industry is
82

Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2004).

83

15 U.S.C. § 1803(b).

84 Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1293
(D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd without opinion by equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38

(1989).
85

For an extreme example, see id. In addition to the opinions cited there, the

case generated a long district court opinion, Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v.
Thornburgh, 965 F. Supp. 1216 (D.D.C. 1988), and six dissents from the denial of
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particularly sensitive politically, and Attorney General decisions
86
often seemed more driven by politics than careful antitrust analysis.
The results of this type of an exemption-granting process might have
been better in a less sensitive area.
My own sense is that legal certainty, or less legal uncertainty,
is a desirable goal, and therefore, I can see merit in granting some
power to an antitrust enforcement agency to make binding rulings
that could not be overturned in private parties in the transaction. On
the other hand, having such powers may impose greater political
pressures on the agency and divert valuable agency resources from
other enforcement duties, as we have seen with the Newspaper
Preservation Act experience in the United States.
Therefore, I would not recommend that a foreign parliament
grant such power to an enforcement agency unless it was fairly strong
and independent (as the EC clearly is). To provide reassurance about
both the process and the results, I would recommend that any such
process be highly transparent and open to objectors. In other words, it
would be like an administrative version of a declaratory judgment
proceeding in which all interested parties could intervene, participate,
and appeal. But the enforcement agency, rather than a random court,
would be the decision-maker.
11. Alternative Fora for Private Antitrust Claims: Can
Arbitration of Antitrust Claims be Made Fair and Effective?
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc.,87 the Supreme Court decided for the first time that Section 4 of
the Clayton Act did not guarantee an antitrust plaintiff access to a
U.S. district court.88 Rather, a Puerto Rican car dealer plaintiff could
be compelled to take its antitrust case to arbitration in Switzerland
because the plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer were bound by a
contract which contained a general arbitration clause calling for
arbitration in Switzerland.8 9 The Court reasoned that a party that had
rehearing en banc by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 868
F.2d 1300.
86 See Brian Gruley, Paper Losses: A Modem Epic of Greed and Betrayal at
America's Two Largest Newspaper Companies (1993) (providing a detailed
critique of the hearing and approval by Attorney General Meese that was subject to
such extensive judicial review in Michigan Citizens).
87 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
88

Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637-38.

89 Id. at 617-20.
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agreed to arbitrate contract-related disputes ought to be held to its
word, even though such a dispute involved a federal statutory claim. 90
Since then, arbitration of antitrust claims has become increasingly
common, and so have disputes over exactly what 9claims
have to be
1
court.
district
the
in
left
be
may
what
arbitrated and
It makes considerable sense to arbitrate antitrust disputes that
are solely between parties to a contract. These may be disputes
arising out of a license or other vertical arrangement, as in Mitsubishi
Motors, or a dispute among joint venture partners. A cheaper and
more expeditious process can be achieved with adequate planning
and sometimes a more expert arbitrator, or panel, provided.
However, serious problems arise when the dispute seriously
involves a party or parties that are not parties to the contract
containing the arbitration clause. Thus, for example, assume that the
plaintiff has bought price-fixed goods from one member of a cartel
under contracts that contain a general arbitration clause. The
plaintiff's claim against the seller is clearly related to the purchase
agreements, but does not arise under the agreements; rather, it is
based on the seller's horizontal agreements with its competitors. 92 If
the plaintiff is compelled to arbitrate against the seller, it could still
proceed separately, under joint and several liability, against the
seller's co-conspirators in district court, but that is hardly a very
efficient process.
The other practical problem concerns discovery. While
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be
excessive and even abusive, discovery in arbitration can sometimes
be the opposite. Some reasonable discovery is generally necessary in
antitrust disputes, because facts are so often critical to determining
liability and/or damages.
To summarize, I would not recommend to a friendly foreign
government that it not go back to the pre-MitsubishiMotors U.S. rule
90 Id. at 637. The practical implications of this course are explored in Donald

I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and
Hazardsfor CorporateCounsel, 48 Bus.

LAW.

395 (1993).

9' See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1517
(10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the plaintiff "may litigate [in District Court] claims
not related to the licensing contract just as anyone else with standing may").
92 See Allied Signal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding that because defendants "could fully comply with the [agreement]
and still cause [plaintiff] antitrust injury by charging uncompetitive prices . . .
[plaintiff's] antitrust claims do not arise under the [agreement] and hence are not
subject to arbitration").
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that antitrust claims were never arbitrable. 93 Rather, I would
recommend that arbitration could be required by statute where (1) the
dispute is principally among parties who have agreed to arbitrate their
disputes with each other, (2) adequate discovery is provided for under
the arbitration clause in the contract or the relevant arbitration rules,
and (3) the arbitration panel meets some minimum threshold of
qualification and independence.

IV. Conclusion
The enactment of the Sherman Act was an important political
event in 1890 as was the enactment of the Clayton Act twenty-four
years later. The treble damage remedy enacted in 1890 and the
private equitable remedies added in 1914 were probably less noticed
than the substantive rules that were being touted to the public, but
they were very much part of the antitrustpackages that were being
touted by political leaders. The perceived ineffectiveness of the
Sherman Act was part of the 1912 presidential campaign and led to
the more detailed provisions of the Clayton Act in 1914.
This political history may help explain why and how the
United States has ended up with a private antitrust system that is
significantly tilted in the plaintiffs' favor. Trusts, monopolists, and
cartels were generators of moral outrage, and it seemed entirely
appropriate to treat them to a fairly harsh system, with criminal
liability or treble damages as central features.
There is an alternative that may well seem politically rational
in other countries, which is to treat antitrust violators as ordinary
tortfeasors-defendants who have to compensate any victim of a
legally cognizable injury to the extent of the plaintiff's proven loss in
court.
Accordingly, were we to go to the Parliament in London,
Berlin, Ottawa, or Tokyo and discuss the eleven questions that I have
just raised, we would likely be met with a more fundamental set of
questions: "why is competition law so different from everything else?
Why should victims get special bounties and advantages that we do
not offer victims of securities frauds or commercial
misrepresentations? Are competition law violators really worse than
these other culprits?"
The glib answer from the American would be, "It's our
history, stupid." But, that is really not a very good answer, however
93

1968).

See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
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accurate it might be. Rather, we would have to try to explain why a
more plaintiff-leaning model of private enforcement, based on U.S.
experience, would be a fairer and more efficient way of
compensating cartel and monopolization victims while enhancing
deterrence. I very much doubt whether a thoughtful American, in
good conscience, could recommend wholesale adoption of the U.S.
private antitrust remedies to a friendly foreign Parliament. However,
the United States has vastly more experience in this area than any
foreign country and some of our experiences and ideas are worthy of
thoughtful study by others.

